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Abstract. It is known that individuals in social networks tend to exhibit homophily
(a.k.a. assortative mixing) in their social ties, which implies that they prefer bonding
with others of their own kind. But what are the reasons for this phenomenon? Is it
that such relations are more convenient and easier to maintain? Or are there also some
more tangible benefits to be gained from this collective behaviour?
The current work takes a game-theoretic perspective on this phenomenon, and studies
the conditions under which different assortative mixing strategies lead to equilibrium in
an evolving social network. We focus on a biased preferential attachment model where
the strategy of each group (e.g., political or social minority) determines the level of
bias of its members toward other group members and non-members. Our first result is
that if the utility function that the group attempts to maximize is the degree centrality
of the group, interpreted as the sum of degrees of the group members in the network,
then the only strategy achieving Nash equilibrium is a perfect homophily, which implies
that cooperation with other groups is harmful to this utility function. A second, and
perhaps more surprising, result is that if a reward for inter-group cooperation is added
to the utility function (e.g., externally enforced by an authority as a regulation), then
there are only two possible equilibria, namely, perfect homophily or perfect heterophily,
and it is possible to characterize their feasibility spaces. Interestingly, these results hold
regardless of the minority-majority ratio in the population.
We believe that these results, as well as the game-theoretic perspective presented herein,
may contribute to a better understanding of the forces that shape the groups and
communities of our society.
Key words: social networks; homophily; game theory
1 Introduction
Homophily (lit. “love of the same”) [15], also known as assortative mixing [17], is a prevalent
and well documented phenomenon in social networks [16]; in making their social ties, people
? Supported in part by a grant of the Israel Science Foundation (1549/13)
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often prefer to connect with other individuals of similar characteristics, such as nationality,
race, gender, age, religion, education or profession.
Homophily has many important consequences, both on the structure of the social network
(e.g., the formation of communities) and on the behaviors and opportunities of participants in
it, for example on the welfare of individuals [12] and on the diffusion patterns of information in
the network [13]. It is therefore interesting to explore the reasons for this phenomenon. Clearly,
one natural reason is that relationship with similar individuals may be more convenient and
easier to maintain. But are there also some more tangible benefits to be gained from this
collective behaviour of sub-populations in the network?
To better understand homophily, we take a different perspective on this phenomenon and
study it through a strategic, game-theoretic prism. We investigate the conditions under which
different assortative (and disassortative) mixing strategies lead to equilibrium in an evolving
social network game.
To model the network evolution, we use a variant of the classical preferential attachment
model [3], which incorporates a heterogeneous population and assortative mixing patterns
for the sub-populations. This model, known as biased preferential attachment (BPA) [2],
maintains the “rich get richer” property, but additionally enables different mixing patterns
(including perfect homophily and heterophily) between sub-populations, by using rejection
sampling.
In this paper, we modify this model by turning it into a game. Each sub-population is
represented as a player who can choose its mixing pattern as a strategy. The utility function
(or payoff) of a player is a result of its population’s (expected) properties in the BPA model.
A strategy profile (describing the strategies of both players) attains a Nash equilibrium for the
game if no player can do better by unilaterally changing its own strategy.
Obviously, the result of the game depends on the players’ utility functions. In the current
study we take an initial step and study two natural utility functions. In the first, we consider
the payoff to be the total power of the group, that is, the sum of degrees of all group members.
In this case we prove that there is a unique stable Nash equilibrium which is the perfect
homophily profile, namely, cooperation with other groups is harmful to this utility function.
We stress that while there are other strategy profiles, like the unbaised profile, that guarantee
the same total power to the groups, those profiles do not yield Nash equilibrium.
Since perfect homophily results in complete segregation of the sub-populations, we consider
a second utility function based on a linear combination between the total power of the group
and the number of cross-population links (i.e., the size of the population cut). In particular,
the utility is taken to be γ times the total power of the group plus 1− γ times the population
cut size, for some weight factor 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Such a utility can be viewed as a rule (or a law)
imposed by a regulator to encourage cooperation between the two sub-populations. At a first
glance, this utility seems to lead to different Nash equilibria for different γ values. Somewhat
surprisingly, we show that only two possible equilibria may emerge. For γ > 1/2, the perfect
homophily profile is the unique Nash equilibrium, and for γ < 1/2, the heterophily profile is
the unique Nash equilibrium. For γ = 1/2, both profiles yield a Nash equilibrium, but only
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(a) piH - homophily (b) piT - heterophily (c) piU - unbiased
Fig. 1. Examples of the Biased Preferential Attachment (BPA) model with various parameter set-
tings. All examples depict a 200-vertex bi-populated network generated by our BPA model starting
from a single edge connecting a blue and a red vertex and 30% red nodes (with vertex size proportional
to its degree).
the perfect homophily yields a stable equilibrium. (Note, by the way, that all our results are
independent of the ratio r between the sizes of the two sub-populations.)
What may we learn from these results? A first, quite intuitive, lesson is that if the payoff
includes benefits for heterophilic edges, then the game can move away from the perfect ho-
mophily equilibrium. But, within the natural utility function we study, if the game moves away
from the homophily equilibrium, then it must reach a perfect heterophily equilibrium. Both
of these equilibria may appear to be too “radical” from a social capital perspective, which
may find it desirable to maintain some balance in-between the two extremes, i.e., preserve
the internal structure of both sub-populations as well as form significant cross-population
links between the two sub-populations. This leaves us with some interesting follow-up re-
search directions: what ‘mechanism design’ rules can a regulator employ in order to have a
more fine-grained control on the equilibrium? what happens in a system with more than two
sub-populations? how do the equilibria behave? We leave these questions for future work;
we believe that taking the game theoretic perspective on evolving social network models for
heterogenous populations is an important tool in understanding homophily, as shown in this
initial model.
2 Related work
Game theory provides a natural framework for modeling selfish interests and the networks
they generate [1, 19]. While many studies (see [11] for a comprehensive survey) focus on local
network formation games, others (e.g., [7]) model the players as making global structural
decisions. In this paper we define a game that features a mixture of both local and global
characteristics. This situation is close to cooperative games [5], where all the nodes of the
same group have the same payment. However, the key idea of cooperative games is to choose
which coalitions to form, whereas here the partition into groups is predefined.
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In this context, one should distinguish between network formation games [14, 11, 19] and
evolving network games (e.g., [6]). The former involve a fixed set of nodes, with the connections
between them changing over time. In contrast, in the evolving network model used herein, the
nodes and edges are both dynamic, and new nodes join the network as it evolves over time.
Based on the assumption that people have tendency to copy the decisions of other people,
we suggest a network construction process that follows the well known preferential attachment
model [3] with an additional phase to incorporate the mixing parameter [2]. However, related
studies in the economics literature examine different procedures to model the social network
formation. The studies of [8, 10] assume that individuals are randomly paired with other
members of the population and then match assortatively. Another model, presented at [6],
suggests two-phase attachments. The nodes first choose their neighbors with a bias towards
their own type and then make an unbiased choice of neighbors from among the neighbors
of their biased neighbors. While the models of [14, 10] and others assume that a connecting
edge between a pair of nodes is fixed by using bilateral agreement, in our model the matching
choice is somewhat ambiguous. The rejection of a proposed connection can be interpreted as
either decided by one of the parties unilaterally or accepted by a bilateral agreement.
One of the main themes of this paper is studying the homophily phenomenon and its
influence on minority-majority groups. McPherson et al. [16] give an overview of research on
homophily and survey a variety of properties and how they lead to particular patterns in
bonding. While some studies (e.g., [8, 9, 2]) model homophily as ranging over a spectrum
between perfect homophily and unbiased society, we have followed [6] and [10], which also
allow disassortative matching.
Currarini, Jackson and Pin [8] examine friendship patterns in a representative sample of
U.S. high schools and build a model of friendship formation based on empirical data. They
report that all groups are biased towards same-type friendship relative to demographics, but
different homophilic patterns emerge as a function of the group size; while homophily is
essentially absent for groups that comprise very small or very large fractions of their school,
it is significant for groups that comprise a middle-ranged fraction. In [10] it is also claimed
that the majority group has greater tendency to homophily. In contrast, we have presented
independence between the size of the group and the mixing pattern. Namely, the majority-
minority parameter r does not influence the attained equilibria. This inconsistency can be
explained by the different construction of the network ([8] and [10] assume random matching
with biased agreement as mentioned above), or perhaps by the simplicity of our model and
the fact that it involves only two groups.
3 Network and Game Model
Our network model is an extension of the bi-populated biased preferential attachment (BPA)
model [2]. We use this model as the basis to an evolving heterogeneous network game. We
start by describing the network model.
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3.1 Biased Preferential Attachment Model
The biased preferential attachment model2 (BPA) [2] is a bi-populated preferential attachment
model obtained by applying the classical preferential attachment model [3] to a bi-populated
minority-majority network augmented with homophily.
Definition 1 (BPA Model, BPA(n, r, pi)). The model describes a bi-populated random
evolving network with red and blue vertices, where n is the total number of nodes, r is the
arrival rate of the red vertices and pi is the mixing matrix. Denote the social network at time
t by Gt = (Vt, Et), where Vt and Et, respectively, are the sets of vertices and edges in the
network at time t, and let dt(v) denote the degree of vertex v at time t. The process starts
with an arbitrary initial bi-populated (red-blue) connected network G0 with n0 vertices and
m0 edges. For simplicity we hereafter assume that G0 consists of one blue and one red vertex
connected by an edge, but this assumption can be removed. This initial network evolves in n
time steps as follows. In every time step t, a new vertex v enters the network. The arrival
rate of the red nodes is denoted by 0 < r < 1, i.e., the new vertex v is red with probability r
and blue with probability 1− r.
In the first stage, v selects a tentative neighbor u at random by preferential attachment,
i.e., with probability proportional to u’s degree at time t,
P[u is chosen] = dt(u)/
∑
w∈Vt
dt(w).
The second stage employs a 2 × 2 stochastic mixing matrix, pi, composed of the stochastic
homophily vectors of each player, piR, piB, i.e.,
pi =
(
piR
piB
)
=
(
ρR 1− ρR
1− ρB ρB
)
.
Letting x ∈ {R, B} be v’s color, the edge (v, u) is inserted into the graph with probability ρx
when u’s color is also x. If the colors differ, then the edge is inserted with probability 1− ρx.
If the edge is rejected (i.e., is not inserted into the graph), then the two-stage procedure is
restarted. This process is repeated until some edge {v, u} has been inserted. Thus in each time
step, one new vertex and one new edge are added to the existing graph.
Note that the mixing matrix pi describes the degree of segregation (incorporated by using
rejection sampling) of the system. In particular, using the perfect homophily matrix
piH =
(
HR
HB
)
=
(
1 0
0 1
)
,
all added edges connect vertex pairs of the same color. At the other extreme, using the perfect
heterophily matrix
piT =
(
TR
TB
)
=
(
0 1
1 0
)
,
2 In fact, here we extend the model of [2] to allow heterophily.
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all added edges connect vertex pairs with different color. Similarly, using the unbiased strategy
matrix
piU =
(
UR
UB
)
=
(
.5 .5
.5 .5
)
,
edges are connected independently of the node colors. For intermediate values 0 < ρR, ρB < 1,
the players show a tendency to favor one kind of interaction over another. When ρR, ρB > 0.5,
the players tend to be homophilic, and when ρR, ρB < 0.5, the players tend to be heterophilic.
Figure 1 presents three examples of parameter settings for the BPA model on a 200-vertex
bi-populated social network with r = 0.3 (30% red nodes), using piH, piT and piU.
3.2 Evolving Heterogeneous Network Games
We now define the evolving heterogeneous EH (t, r, pi, γ) network game (EH game, for short)
between the two sub-populations. The game is played between two players, the red player R
and the blue player B. (Note that we occasionally use R and B to denote either the color, the
corresponding set of nodes, or the corresponding player. The exact meaning will be clear from
the context.)
Assume r and G0 are given to the players. Each player X ∈ {R, B} can now choose its
strategy vector as a mixing vector piX in the mixing matrix pi. Then the network evolves
according the biased preferential attachment model BPA(t, r, pi).
Let nt(R) and nt(B), respectively, denote the number of red and blue nodes at time t > 0,
where nt = nt(R) + nt(B) = n0 + t. Denote by dt(R) (respectively, dt(B)) the sum of degrees
of the red (resp., blue) vertices present in the system at time t ≥ 0. Altogether, the number
of edges in the network at time t is mt = m0 + t, where dt(R) + dt(B) = 2mt.
Let C(Gt) denote the cut of the graph Gt defined by the red-blue partition of Vt, i.e., the
set of edges that have one endpoint in R and the other in B. Formally,
C(Gt) = {(u, v) ∈ Et | u ∈ R, v ∈ B} .
Let φ(Gt) = |C(Gt)| denote the size of the cut.
In our game, the payoff of each player is a combination of two quantities: the total power
of its sub-population (namely, its expected sum of degrees), and the expected cut size φ(G).
Observe that these quantities pull in opposite directions, hence they are balanced using a
parameter 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 that will serve as a weighting factor for the utility function of the
game. The parameter γ can be viewed as set by a regulator to enforce cooperation between
sub-populations. Formally, the payoffs (utilities) of the players R and B at time t are
Uγt (R) = γ
dt(R)
dt
+ (1− γ) φt
2mt
=
1
dt
(
γdt(R) + (1− γ)φt
)
,
Uγt (B) = γ
dt(B)
dt
+ (1− γ) φt
2mt
=
1
dt
(
γdt(B) + (1− γ)φt
)
.
A strategy profile pi is a Nash equilibrium for the game EH (t, r, pi, γ) if no player X ∈
{R, B} can do better by unilaterally changing its own strategy piX. A Nash equilibrium for
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the game EH (t, r, pi, γ) is stable if a small change in pi for one player leads to a situation
where two conditions hold: (i) the player who did not change has no better strategy in the
new circumstance, and (ii) the player who did change is now playing with a strictly worse
strategy. If both conditions are met, then the player who changed its pi will return immediately
to the Nash equilibrium, hence the equilibrium is stable. If condition (i) does not hold (but
condition (ii) does), then the equilibrium is unstable.
4 Degree Maximization Game
Before studying the behavior of the general evolving heterogeneous network game, let us
consider the solution of the game in the basic case where γ = 1 for every t, i.e., each player’s
utility depends only on the expected sum of degrees.
An urn process. The biased preferential attachment BPA(n, r, pi) process can also be inter-
preted as a Polya’s urn process, where each new edge added to the graph corresponds to two
new balls added to the urn, one for each endpoint, and the balls are colored by the color of
the corresponding vertices. In this interpretation, a time step of the original evolving network
process corresponds to the arrival of a new ball x (which is red with probability r and blue
with probability 1− r), and in the ensuing procedure, we choose an existing ball y from the
urn uniformly at random; now, if x is of the same (respectively, different) color x ∈ R, B as
y, then with probability ρx (resp., 1 − ρx) we add to the urn both x and a second copy of y
(corresponding to the two endpoints of the added edge), and with probability 1 − ρx (resp.,
ρx) we reject the choice of y and repeat the experiment, i.e., choose another existing ball
y′ from the urn uniformly at random. This is repeated until the choice of y is not rejected.
Hence the arrival of each new ball x results in the addition of exactly two new balls to the
urn, namely, x and a copy of some existing ball y.
The key observation is that to analyze the expected fraction of the red balls in the urn at
time t, there is no need to keep track of the degrees of individual vertices in the corresponding
process of evolving network; the sum of degrees of all red vertices, dt(R), is exactly the number
of red balls in the urn. Noting that exactly two balls join the system in each time step, we
have
dt(R) + dt(B) = dt = 2t+ n0 = 2(t+ 1).
Note that while dt(R) and dt(B) are random variables, dt is not.
Convergence of expectations. Let αt = dt(R)/dt be a random variable denoting the
fraction of red balls in the system at time t. Given the mixing matrix pi, we claim that the
process will converge to a ratio of α red balls in the system (as a function of pi). More formally,
we claim that, regardless of the starting condition, there exists a limit α = limt→∞ E[αt] .
Lemma 1. E [αt+1 | αt] = αt + F (αt)− αt
t+ 2
, where
F (x) =
1
2
(
1 +
ρB(−1 + r)(−1 + α)
−α+ ρB(−1 + 2α) +
rρRα
1− α+ ρR(−1 + 2α)
)
.
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Proof. Given that the new vertex at time t+ 1 is blue, the probability PBB that it attaches to
a blue vertex satisfies
PBB(αt) = (1− αt)ρB + αtρBPBB(αt) + (1− αt)(1− ρB)PBB(αt),
hence
PBB(αt) =
ρB − ρBαt
ρB + αt − 2ρBαt
Similarly, given that the new vertex at time t + 1 is red, the probability PRR that it attaches
to a red vertex satisfies
PRR(αt) = αtρR + αt(1− ρR)PRR(αt) + (1− αt)ρRPRR(αt),
hence
PRR(αt) =
ρRαt
1− αt + ρR(2αt − 1) .
We later express PBB and PRR as a function of αt, i.e.,
PBB(x) =
ρB − ρBx
ρB + x− 2ρBx ,
PRR(x) =
ρRx
1− x+ ρR(1− 2x) . (1)
In each step the sum of the degrees increases by 2, so dt+1 = dt+2. We start from an arbitrary
ratio α0 = d0(R)/d0. Let Nt(x) be a random variable denoting the number of new red balls
at time t assuming αt = x. Then
Nt+1(x) =

0, with probability (1− r)PBB(x)
(a blue ball entered and chose a blue ball),
2, with probability rPRR(x)
(a red ball entered and chose a red ball),
1, with the remaining probability
(a blue ball chose a red ball or vice versa),
(2)
and
dt(R) = d0(R) +
t∑
i=1
Nt(αi−1).
We now define Et = E [Nt+1(αt)] and calculate it to be
Et = E [dt+1(R)− dt(R) | αt]
= 1 · ((1− (1− r)PBB(αt)− rPRR(αt)) + 2 · rPRR(αt)
= 1− (1− r)PBB(αt) + rPRR(αt)
= 1− (1− r) ρB − ρBαt
ρB + αt − 2ρBαt + r
ρRαt
1− αt + ρR(1− 2αt)
= 2F (αt).
Substituting dt+1(R) = 2(t+ 2)αt+1 and dt(R) = 2(t+ 1)αt and rewriting yields the lemma.
uunionsq
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Lemma 2. The function F (x) has the following properties:
1. F (x) is monotonically increasing.
2. F (x) has exactly one fixed point, α ∈ [0, 1].
3. The image of the unit interval by F (x) is contained in the unit interval:
F ([0, 1]) =
[
r
2 ,
1+r
2
] ⊂ [0, 1].
4. If x < α then x < F (x) < α and if x > α then x > F (x) > α.
Proof. For the first property, observe that
∂F
∂x
=
1
2
(
(−1 + ρB)ρB(−1 + r)
(ρB + x− 2ρBx)2 −
r(−1 + ρR)ρR
(−1 + ρR + x− 2ρRx)2
)
> 0 (3)
for every x, ρR, ρB ∈ [0, 1] and r ∈ (0, 1).
For the second property, we define the function G(x) = F (x) − x. The roots of G(x)
correspond to the fixpoints of F (x) so we will show that G(x) has exactly one real root in the
interval [0, 1]. We arrange G(x) as G(x) = Q(x)W (x) where
W (x) = 2(−x+ ρB(−1 + 2x))(1− x+ ρR(−1 + 2x)).
Since the denominator W (x) is positive for each r, x, ρB, ρR ∈ [0, 1], it is enough to show that
the numerator Q(x) has exactly one real root in the interval [0, 1] as shown in Lemma 3 below.
The third property follows from the fact that the function F (x) is strictly monotonically
increasing and by evaluating the function F (x) for the two extreme values F (0) = r/2, and
F (1) = (1 + r)/2.
Finally, the fourth property follows from the fact that the function is strictly monotonically
increasing, that there is only one fixed point and that F (x) maps [0, 1] inside [0, 1]. uunionsq
Lemma 3. The polynomial
Q(x) = 2(−1 + 2ρB)(−1 + 2ρR)x3 + (−3 + 7ρB + ρBr + 4ρR − 10ρBρR + rρR − 4ρBrρR)x2
+(1− 3ρB − 2ρBr − ρR + 3ρBρR + 4ρBrρR)x+ ρBr − ρBrρR
has a unique root in [0, 1].
Proof. In what follows, we employ Sturm’s Theorem (to be explained next) in order to bound
the number of distinct real roots of Q(x).
Consider some degree n polynomial P (x) = anx
n + ... + a1x + a0 over the reals. The
Sturm sequence of P (x) is a sequence of polynomials denoted by p0(x), p1(x), ..., pm(x), where
p0(x) = P (x), p1(x) = dP (x)/dx, and pi(x) = remainder(pi−2(x)/pi−1(x)) for i > 1. This
recursive definition terminates at step m such that remainder(pm−1(x)/pm(x)) = 0. Since
the degree of pi(x) is at most n− i, we conclude that m ≤ n. Define SCp(t) to be the number
of sign changes in the sequence p0(t), p1(t), ..., pm(t). We are now ready to state the following
theorem attributed to Jacques Sturm, 1829 (cf. [4]).
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Theorem 1 (Sturm’s condition). Consider two reals a, b, where a < b and neither of them
is a root of P (x). Then the number of distinct real roots of P (x) in the interval (a, b) is
SCp(a)− SCp(b).
Let’s examine the Sturm sequence of Q in (0, 1) for every ρR, ρB, checking different ρ ranges
as follows.
For ρB ∈ (0, 12 ) and ρR ∈ ( 12 , 1): To find the number of roots between 0 and 1, we first
evaluate p0(x), p1(x), p2(x) and p3(x) at x = 1 and get the sequences of signs of the results:
{−,−,−,−}, which contains no sign changes. Evaluating p0(x), p1(x), p2(x) and p3(x) at
x = 0 yields two optional sequences of signs of the results: for 1/2 < ρR < (1 + 2r)/(1 + 4r)
and (−1 + ρR)/(−3 + 3ρR − 2r + 4ρRr) < ρB < 1/2 we get {+,−,−,−}. Otherwise, we get
the sequences of signs {+,+, ∗,−} (where ∗ is + or −). All of the sequences contain one sign
changes, hence, the number of roots of Q between 0 and 1 is 1− 0 = 1 as needed.
For ρB ∈ ( 12 , 1) and ρR ∈ (0, 12 ): To find the number of roots between 0 and 1, we evaluate
p0(x), p1(x), p2(x) and p3(x) at x = 0 and get the sequence of signs: {+,−,+,−} which
contains three sign changes. The same procedure for x = 1 gives for 1/2 < ρB < (−3 +
2r)/(−5 + 4r) and (1− ρB)/(5− 7ρB − 2r+ 4ρBr) < ρR < 1/2 the sign sequences: {−,−,+,−}.
Otherwise, we get the sequences {−,+, ∗,−} (where ∗ is + or −) . Since all of these contain
two sign changes, we get that the number of roots of Q between 0 and 1 is 3−2 = 1 as needed.
For ρR, ρB ∈ (0, 12 ) or ρR, ρB ∈ ( 12 , 1) we get that Q(1) < 1 and Q(0) > 0. Observe that
Q(x) =∞ when x→∞ and Q(x) = −∞ when x→ −∞. This implies that there are one or
three roots in both intervals (−∞, 0) and (1,∞). Knowing that Q(x) has exactly three roots
concludes the claim that G has exactly one root in [0, 1].
Finally, when either ρR = 1 and 0 ≤ ρB < 1, or ρB = 0 and 0 < ρR < 1, there is a root of M
at x = 0, hence these cases must be dealt with separately. Another special case occurs when
ρR, ρB =
1
2 . For each of these special cases we explicitly solve the equation M(x) = 0 and show
that there is a unique root at (0, 1). Lemma 3 follows. uunionsq
Assume w.l.o.g. that αt < α. By Lemma 2 αt < F (αt) < α, so by Lemma 1 αt <
E [αt+1 | αt] < α. Taking expectations, we get that E[αt] < E[αt+1] < E[α] = α. We have
thus shown that the expected value of αt converges to the fixed point α of F (x). We have
thus established the following.
Theorem 2. Given the rate r of red nodes and the mixing matrix pi, for any initial graph,
as t tends to infinity, the expected fraction of red balls, E[αt], converges to the unique real
α ∈ (0, 1) satisfying the equation F (α) = α, or
2α = 1 +
ρB(−1 + r)(−1 + α)
−α+ ρB(−1 + 2α) +
rρRα
1− α+ ρR(−1 + 2α) .
Hence the limit α is the solution of the cubic equation
(2− 4ρB − 4ρR + 8ρBρR)α3 + (−3 + 7ρB + ρBr + 4ρR − 10ρBρR + rρR − 4ρBrρR)α2
+ (1− 3ρB − 2ρBr − ρR + 3ρBρR + 4ρBrρR)α+ ρBr − ρBrρR = 0.
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Note that this limit is independent of the initial values d0 and α0 of the system.
Existence of a Nash Equilibrium. Having shown that for any given strategy profile pi the
expected fraction of red node degrees converges to α, we examine the influence of the different
strategies on the utility functions.
Lemma 4. The limit α and E[αt] are monotone in the mixing matrix entries, i.e., both in-
crease with increasing ρR and decrease with increasing ρB.
Proof. We show (strict) monotonicity in ρR; a similar proof can be obtained for ρB. Consider
two urn processes Ψ and Ψ ′ corresponding to the games BPA(n,G0, r, pi) and BPA(n,G0, r, pi′),
where
pi =
(
ρR 1− ρR
1− ρB ρB
)
and pi′ =
(
ρR + 
′ 1− (ρR + ′)
1− ρB ρB
)
for some ′ > 0. Denote by αt =
dt(R)
dt
and α′t =
d′t(R)
dt
the fraction of red balls at time t in Ψ
and Ψ ′ respectively. Let α = limt→∞ E[αt] and α′ = limt→∞ E[α′t].
In order to prove the first part of the lemma (i.e., the claim on the limit α) we show that
α < α′. Let F (x) and F ′(x) be the functions defined for the process Ψ and Ψ ′ respectively.
Observe that ∂F/∂ρR > 0 for each ρ, r ∈ [0, 1] and x ∈ (0, 1), so F (x) < F ′(x) for every
x ∈ (0, 1). Note that F (α) = α and F ′(α′) = α′ are the unique fixed points of F (x) and
F ′(x), respectively, hence α = F (α) < F ′(α′) = α′ as required.
The proof of the second part of the lemma (i.e., the claim on E[αt]) uses stochastic domi-
nation (see cf. [18]). We give the formal definition and a basic theorem that we use.
Definition 2 (Stochastic domination). Let X and Y be two random variables, not neces-
sarily on the same probability space. The random variable X is stochastically smaller than Y ,
denoted X  Y , if P[X > z] ≤ P[Y > z] for every z ∈ R. If additionally P[X > z] < P[Y > Z]
for some z, then X is stochastically strictly less than Y , denoted X ≺ Y .
Theorem 3 (stochastic order). Let X and Y be two random variables, not necessarily on
the same probability space.
1. Suppose X ≺ Y . Then E[U(X)] < E[U(Y )] for any strictly increasing continuous utility
function U .
2. Suppose X1 ≺ Y1 and X2 ≺ Y2, for four random variables X1, Y1, X2 and Y2. Then
aX1 + bY1 ≺ aX2 + bY2 for any two constants a, b > 0.
Let Nt+1(x) (respectively, N
′
t+1(x)) be a random variable denoting the number of new red
balls at time t+ 1 in Ψ (resp., Ψ ′) assuming αt = x (resp., α′t = x).
Lemma 5. Nt+1(x) ≺ N′t+1(x) for any 0 < x < 1 and integer t ≥ 0.
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Proof. By Eq. (1) and (2),
P[Nt+1(x) = 0] = P[N′t+1(x) = 0],
P[Nt+1(x) = 2] < P[N′t+1(x) = 2].
Hence P[Nt+1(x) > z] ≤ P[N′t+1(x) > z] for every z ∈ R and P[N1(α0) > 1] < P[N′1(α0) > 1],
yielding Nt+1(x) ≺ N′t+1(x). uunionsq
Lemma 6. For t ≥ 0, if αt ≺ α′t then Nt+1(αt) ≺ N′t+1(α′t).
Proof. We would like to show that for every z,
P[Nt+1(αt) > z] ≤ P[N′t+1(α′t) > z].
Denoting expectation according to the r.v. Z by EZ [·], we have
P[Nt+1(αt) > z] = Eαt [P[Nt+1(αt) > z]] ≤ Eαt
[
P[N′t+1(αt) > z]
]
≤ Eα′t
[
P[N′t+1(α′t) > z]
]
= P[N′t+1(α′t) > z],
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 5, which shows that Nt+1(x)  N′t+1(x), and
the second is by Theorem 3(1), noting that P[N′t+1(x) > z] is monotone in x.
To show strictness (i.e., Nt+1(αt) ≺ N′t+1(α′t)) we consider z = 1 and show that
P[Nt+1(αt) > 1] < P[N′t+1(α′t) > 1]. uunionsq
Lemma 7. αt ≺ α′t for t ≥ 0.
Proof. Note that
dt(R) = d0(R) +
t∑
i=1
Ni(αi−1),
d′t(R) = d
′
0(R) +
t∑
i=1
N′i(α
′
i−1).
We prove the claim by induction, over t.
Induction basis. d0(R) = d
′
0(R) = cR for some constant cR > 0. Then α0 =
cR
d0
= α′0. It follows
that
P[N1(α0) = 0] =
(1− r)ρB(α0 − 1)
ρB(α0 − 1)− (1− ρB)α0 = P[N
′
1(α
′
0) = 0]
and
P[N1(α0) = 2] =
rρRα0
(1− ρR)(1− α0) + ρRα0 <
r(ρR + )α0
(1− ρR)(1− α0) + (ρR + )α0 = P[N
′
1(α
′
0) = 2],
hence P[N1(α0) > z] ≤ P[N1(α′0) > z] for every z ∈ R and P[N1(α0) > 1] < P[N1(α′0) > 1],
yielding N1(α0) ≺ N′1(α′0).
Induction step. Suppose that αt ≺ α′t holds. By Lemma 6, Nt+1(αt) ≺ N′t+1(α′t). Hence
dt+1(R) = dt(R) + Nt+1(αt) ≺ d′t(R) + N′t+1(α′t) = dt+1(R),
where dt(R) ≺ d′t(R) by the induction assumption. Note we also used Theorem 3(2). This
implies αt+1 ≺ α′t+1 as needed. uunionsq
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By Theorem 3 we get E[αt] < E[α′t], which complete the proof of the second part of Lemma
4. uunionsq
Given the utility functions U1t (R) = dt(R) and U
1
t (B) = dt(B), each player can choose its row
in the mixing matrix pi. By Theorem 2 we get that U1t→∞(R) = dtα and U
1
t→∞(B) = dt(1−α).
Lemma 4 implies that the red and blue players maximize their utility by increasing ρR and ρB,
respectively. Hence, the homophily strategy profile piH is strictly dominant for both players.
The same applies for t <∞.
Theorem 4. The homophily strategy profile piH is a unique Nash equilibrium for the game
EH (t, r, pi, γ = 1).
5 Utilitiy Maximization Game
The evolving heterogeneous network game EH (t, r, pi, γ) for a bi-populated network consists
of two contrasting ingredients, the expected sum of degrees d(·) and the cut size φ(G). The
following theorem expresses the impact of these forces on the system as a function of the
weighting factor γ.
Theorem 5. Consider the evolving network game EH (t, r, pi, γ) for 0 < r < 1.
1. For γ > 1/2, the homophily strategy profile piH is a unique Nash equilibrium.
2. For γ < 1/2, the heterophily strategy profile piT is a unique Nash equilibrium.
3. For γ = 1/2, the only two Nash equilibria are piH and piT. The homophily strategy profile piH
is a stable Nash equilibrium, while the heterophily strategy profile piT is an unstable Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. Let Mt(x) be a random variable denoting the number of new cut edges at time t. We
have
Mt+1(x) =
0, with probability (1− r)PBB(x) + rPRR(x),1, with the remaining probability,
and
φ(Gt) = φ(G0) +
t∑
i=1
Mi(αi−1).
Define the potential function of the red player, denoted ∆R, as the expected increment of its
utility at step t. Then
∆R = E
[
Uγt+1(R)− Uγt (R) | α
]
= γNt+1(α) + (1− γ)Mt+1(α)
= γ(1− (1− r)PBB(α) + rPRR(α)) + (1− γ)(1− ((1− r)PBB(α) + rPRR(α)))
= 1− (1− r)PBB(α) + r(2γ − 1)PRR(α) .
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Similar considerations imply that the potential function of the blue player is:
∆B = 1− rPRR(α) + (1− r)(2γ − 1)PBB(α).
Let’s examine the value of the potential functions ∆R and ∆B for every γ, checking different
γ ranges as follows.
γ > 1/2: In this range the value of PRR contributes positively to ∆R and negatively to ∆B.
Hence, the red player would like to increase PRR. This would be done by increasing ρR as shown
in Lemma 8. Similarly, in this range PBB contributes positively to ∆B and negatively to ∆R.
Hence, the blue player prefers to increase ρB. It follows that the homophily strategies HR and
HB are strictly dominant for both players.
Note that this result also holds for the special case where γ = 1, as shown in Theorem 4.
γ < 1/2: Here, both PRR and PBB provide negative contributions to ∆R and ∆B. Therefore,
decreasing ρR implies decreasing PRR but also increasing PBB (see Lemma 8). The variation
of PBB is due to the influence of ρR on 1 − α, which is similar to the variation of PRR due
to α. However, PRR is also decreased directly by ρR, hence the red player prefers to decrease
ρR. Similarly, the blue player would like to decrease ρB, which implies that the heterophily
strategies TR and TB are strictly dominant.
Note that this result also holds for the special case where γ = 0. In this case, the utility is
based only on the cut G(φ), so it is clear that the best strategy for both players is to attach
to a node of the opposite color as dictated by the heterophily strategy.
γ = 1/2: In this range the potential function value is
∆R = (1− (1− r)PBB) =
(
1− (1− r) ρB(1− α)
ρB(1− α) + α(1− ρB)
)
.
Although the strategy of the red player, ρR, does not appear explicitly in this expression, it
appears implicitly in α. Setting ρR = 0 implies PBB = 0, yielding ∆R = 1. Similarly, setting
ρB = 0 yields ∆B = 1. Since 1 is the maximum value of ∆R and ∆B, it follows that the
heterophily strategies are dominant for both players, i.e., piT is a Nash equilibrium.
However, as in the case of γ > 1/2, when ρB > 0 the red player would minimize α by
increasing ρR as shown in Lemma 4. Similarly, when ρR > 0 the blue player would increase ρB.
This leads both players to the homophily strategies HR and HB. Thus, piT is an unstable Nash
equilibrium and piH is a stable Nash equilibrium. uunionsq
Lemma 8. PRR and PBB are monotone in the entries of the mixing matrix:
– PRR increases with increasing ρR and decreases with increasing ρB, and
– PBB increases with increasing ρB and decreases with increasing ρR.
Proof. Observing that ∂PRR∂ρR > 0 and
∂PRR
∂α > 0, and using Lemma 4, yields the first part of the
claim. Similarly, ∂PBB∂ρB > 0 and
∂PBB
∂α < 0 yield the second part. uunionsq
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6 Discussion
This work investigates the assortative mixing phenomenon using a game theory perspective.
Given some predefined rules related to the probability of connecting to other node, each player
is allowed to determine its strategy in order to maximize its payoff. First we used a utility
function that captures degree centrality, and showed that the expected sum of degrees and its
limit are monotonically increasing with the homophily tendency. This directly implies that
the homophily strategy is the unique Nash equilibrium. In this context, it will be interesting
to use different centrality measures (such as PageRank, betweenness, etc.) and examine their
influence on the equilibria. Next we enhanced the utility function to give positive payoff for
both the degree and the cut. The results we have presented show a phase transition in the
strategy as a function the weight γ. A small fluctuation in γ might cause extreme changes
in the preference of the players, i.e., from perfect homophily to perfect heterophily (or vice
versa); the intermediate strategies are never in equilibrium. This result is independent of the
fraction of the sub-population size in the population. Generalizing the model to more than
two sub-populations or reformulating the utility function may shape the strategy function
differently.
An interesting outcome of the above is the possibility that setting a rule (or a law) by a
regulator to encourage cooperation between the two sub-populations will play as a remedial
strategy to achieve equal opportunities. This observation is remarkable since, in contrast to
the usual affirmative action approach, this attitude does not discriminate any individual, but
at the same time, it promises a fair representation of the different sub-populations and even
a way for breaking the glass ceiling [2] that some minority sub-populations suffer from. We
leave this direction for further work.
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